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lature looks with disfavor upon any suggested change in the criminal procedure.4 3
So long as the concept can be traced to the legitimate parentage of public morals,
opinions, and ideals which collectively is the womb for the embryomc formulation
of our sense of right and justice, our principles are being preserved. In short, this
is the nductive process of how the question of "what is due process of law" in a
given situation is determined. As tis elastic test of subjectivity extends, the need
for corresponding remedies becomes manifest. Coram nobts is the answer.
JOHN W SUBLETrr
DO KENTUCKY CITIES HAVE ANY INHERENT RIGHTS AS TO LOCAL
FUNCTIONS FREE FROM LEGISLATIVE CONTROL?
Under the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution all powers
not delegated to the United States are reserved to the States and to the people.
This came about because of the nature of the Federal government wich was
created by a compact between sovereign states. Such a relationship does not exist
between a city and a state. In fact the reverse is true, since cities have ordinarily
been created by the state in the first instance and derive all their governmental
powers from the state. Therefore, it would seem that a state legislature, except
as limited by express provisions in the state constitution, would have plenary
power in respect to cities within the boundaries of the state as to governmental
functions. This is the view generally accepted and is often extended to include
even local functions. However, in a few jurisdictions it is recognized that a city
has certain inherent rights in regard to local functions without the aid of any
express state constitutional provision. This doctrine originated in People v Hurl-
but,' an early Michigan case, where judge Cooley conceived and advanced the
theory that a city has certain inherent rights, irrespective of constitutional pro-
visions, %vluch ciannot be abrogated by the legislature. An attempt will be made
to ascertain the position of the Kentucky Court of Appeals in relation to this
doctrine.
In order to determine whether a Kentucky city has any inherent rights free
from legislative control, such as those afforded to an individual, it is of prime
importance to consider the Court's view of the nature and source of the city s right
to exist. The status of the city in relation to the legislature is described in an
early Kentucky case as follows:
"Cities and towns are mere creatures of the legislature,
and the power exists in that department of the state government not
only to abolish the courts but to destroy the existence of the corpora-
tion by a repeal of its charter."2
From this statement it is apparent that the legislature is deemed to be the creator
and the city a mere creature or agent; therefore, the only conclusion is that the
city has no right to exist except vith the consent of the legislature.
' Orfield, CmuNAir PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL (1947). Comment.
50 YALE L. J. 107 (1940).
124 Mich. 44, 93 (1871)" For conflicting positions as to the soundness of the
doctrine see McQuillin, Constitutional Right of Local Self Government of Munici-
palities, 35 Am. L. REv. 510 (1901) and McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent
Right of Local Self-Government, 16 COL. L. REv. 190, 299 (1916).
"Boyd v. Chambers, 78 Ky. 140, 143 (1879).
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Does this absolute dependency for existence place the city at the legislature s
mercy as to all rights? An examination of the State Constitution reveals that,
while there is no "home rule" provision in the Constitution, there are at least three
provisions which impose certain constitutional limitations on the powers of the
legislature as against the cities.' This observation is confirmed by a recent Ken-
tucky case where the court said:
"The general rule is that in the absence of a constitutional
provision safeguarding it to them, municipalities have no right to self-
government which is beyond the legislative control of the state. There
are states in the Union wherein the right of home rule is established
or recognized in their Constitutions."'
These express provisions protecting the rights of the city are obviously limited,
and it remains to be determined whether, and, if so, on what grounds, the Court
of Appeals has recognized any implied "inherent rights" of a city to act free from
legislative control.
The apparent beginning of the inherent rights doctrine in Kentucky was in
1902 in the case of City of Lexington v. Thompson.r A state statute provided a
salary range for the members of the fire departments of second class cities. The
city of Lexington refused to pay according to the new scale, and a member of
the Lexington Fire Department brought an action against the city to recover the
difference between his actual pay and that prescribed by the legislature. No ex-
press constitutional prohibition was involved, but, nevertheless, the statute was
held to be unconstitutional. The court relied heavily upon the case of People v.
Hurlbut.' The following passage from the Thompson case is a concise statement
of the inherent rights doctrine:
"The legislature can not take away from the community
rights or property which existed or were acquired without the aid of
legislation. A mumeipality has a dual character. In its character as
a State agency it exercises governmental, political, public and ad-
ministrative powers and duties. In its capacity as a private corpora-
tion it exercises rights and powers inherent in the people of the com-
munity, which have never been surrendered to any department of the
government, and which are property rights within the protection of
the Constitution."'
It should be noted that the language used indicates that the doctrine is based upon
an analogy to the delegation and reservation of power theory as it exists between
the States and the Federal government. Such a basis is probably unsound because
a state constitution, unlike the Federal Constitution, is not a delegation of power
to the state government, but rather is a limitation upon a power which would other-
'See. 59 prohibiting the General Assembly from passing local or special
legislation dealing with certain subjects. See. 156 classifying all cities into sx
classes. See. 181 prohibiting the General Assembly from taxing for local purposes.
'Callis v. Brown, 283 Ky. 759, 766, 142 S.W 2d 675, 678 (1940). To the
same effect is Allen v. Hollingsworth, 246 Ky. 812, 816, 56 S.W 2d 530, 531
(1938)- "Apart from restraints of the organic law, the Legislature has plenary
powers in respect to the establishment and regulation of the government of
mumcipalities.
113 Ky. 540, 68 S.W 477 (1902).
'See note 1 supra.
113 Ky. at 548, 68 S.W at 479.
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wise be absolute.' The language further implies that these inherent rights of the
city which have not been surrendered are property rights entitled to protection
under the due process clause of the Federal Constitution. It is probably too late
to argue that the phrase in the Tenth Amendment, "powers reserved to the
States respectively or to the people," gives to the people as a whole, as distin-
guished from the States as such, any separate powers, except perhaps the power
to adopt and amend the state constitutions. But the argument that the people of
a community, individually or collectively, may have rights which they have dele-
gated to their city, and thereby clothed the city with the protection of the due
process clause, is more intriguing. By way of analogy, one might also say that
private corporations are creatures of the legislature and derive their powers from
it; yet it cannot be denied that once created such corporations are entitled to the
protection of the due process clause.
Three years after the Thompson, case its authority was questioned in City of
Paducah v. Evitts.' In this case a statute provided for the election and compensa-
tion of jailors in cities of the second class. An ordinance of the city of Paducah
set the jailor s salary at a rate less than that established by the statute. It was
held that the ordinance was in conflict with the statute and was therefore invalid.
The Thompson case had been cited by counsel in support of the validity of the
ordinance, but the court in expressing doubt as to the correctness of that opinion
stated that even if it were followed the same result would be reached because the
regulation of police systems is a governmental or public matter subject to the
control of the legislature.
In Schmitt v. Dooling,o decided in 1911, the authority of the Thompson case
was again shaken, at least to the extent of changing the classification of a fireman.
The court, in holding an assignment of a city fireman s salary void, classified him
as a public officer "engaged in the discharge of a governmental function."'1 This
opinion apparently overruled the holding in the Thompson case that the regula-
tion of a city fire department is a matter of local and not of governmental concern.
The doctrine of inherent local self-government was again seemingly repu-
diated by the Kentucky Court in 1928. In that year it was held, in the case of
Board of Trustees of Policemen s Pension Fund v. Schupp," that a statute provid-
ing for doubling the existing pensions paid to the policemen of Louisville was
valid. The court expressed its disapproval of the inherent rights doctrine in the
following language:
"The theory that the right of local self-government inheres
in the municipalities of this state is essentially unsound, and is based
upon the now discarded doctrine that the Constitution of this state
is a grant or delegation of power by the people of the state to the
state government, and is not, as is now generally recognized, a limita-
tion upon a power which, merely by virtue of its sovereignty, would
otherwise be absolute.' =
Board of Trustees of Policemen s Pension Fund v. Schupp, 223 Ky. 269,
3 S.W 2d 606 (1928). In this case the court criticized thebasis of the theory,
but still held that under Sec. 181 of the Constitution there was a distinction be-
tween matters purely local in nature and matters of state wide concern, and that
the maintenance of order falls in the latter group.
'120 Ky. 444, 86 S.W 1123 (1905).
10145 Ky. 240, 140 S.W 197 (1911).
Id. at 244, 140 S.W at 198.
223 Ky. 269, 3 S.W 2d 606 (1928).
"Id. at 274, 3 S.W 2d at 609. The prevailing view even in those states hay-
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However, the decision was based primarily on the finding that the police function
of cities is not a local matter and therefore Section 181 of the Kentucky Constitu-
tion, which prohibits the General Assembly from imposing taxes for local purposes,
did not invalidate the statute in question. This being so, the statement relative
to inherent rights was only strong dictum, because that doctrine has never been
applied except as to matters that are considered local. In fact, the court's lan-
guage quoted above as to inherent nghts was rather remarkable in view of a later
statement in the same opimon to the effect that from reading Section 181 of the
Constitution it was apparent that the makers provided for the twofold character
of cities-one purely local and the other governmental in nature affecting the state
at large. Tis distinction would appear to be meamngless unless there were some
kind of inherent rights relating at least to local affairs. Apparently, however, the
court in this particular case limited the scope of the distinction to questions ansing
under Section 181 of the Constitution.
In Warley v. Board of Park Commissioners" decided in 1930, the authority
of the Thompson case was relied on by counsel in an effort to have a statute de-
clared invalid which gave the Board of Park Commissioners of Louisville the
power to designate certain parks for whites and certain ones for the colored. 'The
statute was nevertheless held valid and the theory of inherent local government
as espoused by the Thompson case was again criticized. The court did say that
the General Assembly could not legislate on fiscal matters and other things of
purely local concern, and this statement might seem to indicate that the inherent
rights doctrine was still recognized, but considering it in conjunction with the
criticism of the doctrine elsewhere in the opinion it is probable that the court was
refermng only to express constitutional provisions." Authority for this conclusion
is the 1930 case of Campbell v. Board of Trustees of Fireman s Pension Fund of
Louisville." A statute had made it mandatory that cities of the first class levy
a prescribed ad valorem tax to create a pension fund for retired fireman. The
statute was held to contravene Section 181 of the Constitution. At the same time,
the court attempted to rescue the Thompson case, stating that it had been followed
by later cases, at least to the extent that the maintenance of a fire department is
a muicipal purpose, apparently overlooking or limiting the effect of the holding
in Schmitt v. Dooling. But it was admitted that on the point of inherent rights
of a city the Thompson case had been questioned by later decisions. Since the
Campbell case was decided on the basis of the violation of an express constitu-
tional provision, whatever was said in reference to the inherent rights doctrine,
must be taken as dictum.
The foregoing cases would seem to indicate that the status of the inherent
rights doctrine in Kentucky is uncertain at best. But the doctrine was given new
life in two later cases. The first is Covington Bridge Commission v. City of Cov-
ington," where the court by the following language reaffirmed the rights doctrine
of the Thompson case:
in matters purely governmental in character, a
mumcipality is under the absolute control of the Legislature; but, as
to its proprietary or private functions, the Legislature is under the
Ing home rule provisions in the constitution is that the conduct of a fire depart-
ment is a state concern. See Note, 141 A.L.R. 903 (1942).
"233 Ky. 688, 26 S.W 2d 550 (1930).
aZ See CONSTITTOrroN OF KENTUCKY, secs. 59 and 181.
1235 Ky. 383, 31 S.W 2d 620 (1930).
'257 Ky. 813, 79 S.W 2d 216 (1934).
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same constitutional restraints that are placed upon it in respect to
pnvate corporations."'
Again this was dictim, because the court held that the purchase of an interstate
bridge by a city was not a matter of purely local concern but was clearly of state
concern.
However, in an even more recent case," a statute fixing the minmum salary
for city waterworks commissioners was held invalid solely on the authority of the
Thompson case, as relating to a matter of purely local concern.
Prior to these two cases it would no doubt have been safe to conclude, on
the basis of the cases subsequent to the Thompson case, that the inherent rights
doctrine had been abandoned by the Kentucky Court. Such a conclusion is now
impossible. It seems that the doctrine has been rejuvenated with all the vitality
which it possessed when first advanced in the Thompson case. However, the scope
of the doctrine in Kentucky, as far as the writer is able to discern, has never been
extended specifically to include anything as being of purely municipal concern
except the functions of a city fire department and a city waterworks commission.
The according of limited recognition to the concept of the inherent rights
doctrine of local govermnent in Kentucky need not mean that very far-reaching
results will follow. The separation of powers doctrine will not disintegrate because
the court invalidates a few acts of the legislature without any express constitutional
authorization. But technically, the theory that a state legislature is restricted by
implied extra-constitutional limitations in connection with the cities which it has
created is unsound. Furthermore, the inherent rights doctrine would seem to
need a stronger basis than the changing attitude of the Court of Appeals. Perhaps
a "home rule" constitutional amendment is the solution.
HOLLis E. EDMJONDS
CIVIL LIABILITY OF CHILD TO SUPPORT INDIGENT PARENT
IN KENTUCKY
The support of the aged has become a problem of great magnitude in recent
years. Nearly every state' has passed laws concernig the well being of indigent
parents of adult children who either cannot or will not provide for their parents
support. Many children, who are supported from birth, abandoned their aged
parents and these persons are left without proper support and become charges
of an already overburdened state. How does the law cope with this problem?
Is there a civil liability imposed upon adult children in Kentucky to support their
parents?
First, let it be understood that there is no common law duty to support one s
parent. One of the earlier English cases made this clear when it was said in
Rex v. Munden, "By the law of nature a man was bound to take care of his own
father and mother; but there being no temporal obligation to enforce that law of
nature, it was found necessary to establish it by Act of Parliament "° A Con-
"'Id. at 820, 79 S.W 2d at 219.
"'Board of Aldermen of City of Ashland v. Hunt, 284 Ky. 720, 145 S.W 2d
814 (1940).
'4 VEnmimE, AimRICAN FAILY LAws sec. 235 (1st ed. 1936).
1 Strange 190, 93 Eng. Rep. 465 (1719).
